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N F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A. (Empagran I),1 the
Supreme Court, vacating the D.C. Circuit's ruling,2 held that the For-
eign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act ("FTAIA") precludes courts
from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over antitrust claims by for-
eign plaintiffs who allege unlawful conduct that "significantly and ad-
versely affects both customers outside the United States and customers
within the United States,"' 3 if "the adverse foreign effect is independent
of any adverse domestic effect;"' 4 that is, if "the conduct's domestic effects
did not help to bring about that foreign injury."' 5 The narrowly crafted
decision was tailored to the record facts, and the Court declined to under-
take the kind of comprehensive statutory analysis that had led to a split in
the circuits. The Court thus did not address the situation in which the
alleged unlawful conduct creates domestic anticompetitive effects that
help cause foreign injury, and the Court left the door open for the court
of appeals to consider that argument on remand.6 How wide that open-
ing is remains unclear. The uncertainty about the jurisdictional issue was
exacerbated by the Court's refusal to address the issue of a foreign plain-
tiff's standing. In short, Empagran I raised new questions that the Su-
preme Court will soon have to address. The purpose of this article is to
(1) analyze the Supreme Court's decision in Empagran I on the Sherman
Act's extraterritorial reach; (2) discuss its likely impact on existing and
future antitrust claims by foreign plaintiffs in American courts under the
Sherman Act based on transactions abroad; and (3) examine whether for-
eign plaintiffs injured abroad have standing to sue in American courts
under American law.
* Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law. A.B., University of Notre
Dame; J.D., Cornell Law School; LL.M. and J.S.D. Columbia Law School.
1. 124 S. Ct. 2359 (2004) [hereinafter Empagran I].
2. Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman LaRoche, Ltd., 315 F.3d 338 (D.C. Cir. 2003), va-
cated, 124 S. Ct. 2359 (2004).
3. Empagran 1, 124 S. Ct. at 2366.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 2372.




A. THE FTAIA PASSAGE
In order properly to construe the FTAIA, courts must first look at the
statute in historical context. The FTAIA was enacted as part of the Ex-
port Trading Company Act of 1982,7 at a time when antitrust enforce-
ment was largely but not exclusively an American institution. In the
seventies and early eighties, there was concern in some quarters that
American traders in the international arena, that is, American exporters,
were at a competitive disadvantage vis-A-vis foreign rivals due to the con-
straints of the American antitrust laws.8 Since American traders were
subject to antitrust constraints and foreign rivals were assumed not to be
so constrained, either by American law or another jurisdiction's law, anti-
trust skeptics complained that American exporters competed with their
hands tied.9 To address this perceived inequity, the FTAIA exempted
export transactions from antitrust scrutiny, except if there was a "direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" on United States foreign
commerce, as well as transactions that were wholly foreign. 10
During the same time period, foreign governments and foreign traders
expressed concern that United States courts had overstepped their
bounds and international norms by purporting to enforce United States
laws in matters of foreign commerce.11 These concerns came to a head in
the late 1970s in the Uranium cases. 12 In 1976, Westinghouse, a manufac-
turer of nuclear reactors and a large purchaser and reseller of uranium,
brought an antitrust action in the Northern District of Illinois against
every major uranium supplier in the world, many of whom were based
outside the United States, alleging a massive conspiracy to fix uranium's
price and drive Westinghouse from the field. 13 The foreign firms de-
7. Turicentro, S.A. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 303 F.3d 293, 298-99 (3d Cir. 2002) (saying
FTAIA is Title IV of the Export Trading Company Act); see Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat.
1233 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
8. H.R. REP. No. 97-686, at 4 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487; see The
"In" Porters, S.A. v. Hanes Printables, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 494, 498 (M.D.N.C. 1987) (saying
FTAIA was passed in response to complaints from American firms that the antitrust laws
impaired their ability to increase exports through aggressive competition or cooperation").
9. The "In" Porters, 663 F. Supp. at 498.
10. Turicentro, 303 F. 3d at 299; see also Eurim-Pharm GmbH v. Pfizer Inc., 593 F.
Supp. 1102, 1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("Congress sought to place American-owned companies
operating entirely abroad or in United States export trade on equal footing with their for-
eign-owned competitors by freeing them from the possibility of dual and conflicting anti-
trust regulation").
11. See Commission on the International Application of the United States Antitrust
Laws Act: Hearings on S. 432 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 1st Sess. 49,
61-71 (1981) (remarks of Lloyd Cutler); see also Donald I. Baker, Antitrust Conflicts Be-
tween Friends: Canada and the United States in the Mid-1970's, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 165
(1978); J.S. Stanford, The Application of the Sherman Act to Conduct Outside of the United
States : A View from Abroad, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 195 (1978).
12. In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 342 (N.D. Ill.).
13. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 617 F.2d 1248, 1254-55 (7th Cir.
1978) (noting amici contentions that the Alcoa effects test was no longer the standard for
the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction under the Sherman Act.).
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faulted, but their governments, acting as surrogates, filed amicus briefs
protesting the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction by United States
courts over what they considered wholly foreign conduct.
14
Rejecting the arguments of the amici, the Seventh Circuit upheld the
decision that United States courts had jurisdiction over the foreign de-
fendants.1 5 The Seventh Circuit's rationale on the jurisdictional issue is
instructive; it observed that, historically, the "jurisdictional reach of the
Sherman Act to conduct outside the United States was not favorably re-
ceived" by the courts.1 6 But that narrow approach eroded over time, and
in a line of cases culminating in the Alcoa17 decision, American courts
upheld jurisdiction "so long as the intended effect of that conduct is pro-
hibited by the [Sherman] Act." s18 In the wake of Alcoa, the "effects" test
was widely, but by no means universally, followed by other courts. Con-
cemed that the Alcoa test did not adequately account for foreign states'
interests, the Ninth Circuit in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America
Corp.19 added a gloss to Alcoa by creating a jurisdictional rule of reason
that required a comity-based balancing test and an analysis of domestic
effects when assessing the reach of the antitrust laws over foreign
defendants.
Applying a two-pronged test derived from Alcoa and Timberlane, the
Seventh Circuit in Westinghouse asked (1) whether the trial court had
subject matter jurisdiction; and (2) if so, whether that jurisdiction should
have been exercised, taking into account comity and fairness considera-
tions. 20 Concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
exercising jurisdiction, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision below. 21
The jurisdictional rule-of-reason approach that Timberlane espoused
greatly complicated the jurisdictional analysis and rendered outcomes
less predictable. 22 In enacting the FTAIA, Congress sought to clarify the
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1256.
16. Id. at 1253.
17. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
18. Westinghouse, 617 F.2d at 1253.
19. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
20. Westinghouse, 617 F.2d at 1253.
21. Id. at 1256.
22. See, e.g., Gary E. Dyal, The Canada-United States Memorandum of Understanding
Regarding Application of National Antitrust Law: New Guidelines For Resolution Of Mul-
tinational Antitrust Dispute, 6 Nw. J. Ir'L L. & Bus. 1065, 1076-77 (1984):
The jurisdictional rule of reason [espoused by Timberlane] has not been con-
sistently followed, which has given rise to further criticism, foreign and do-
mestic, that United States jurisdictional rules are imprecise and
unpredictable. The legitimacy of judicial adoption of the comity analysis has
been questioned as an assumption of discretion requiring Congressional ap-
proval. A particularly poignant criticism is that institutional weaknesses in-
herent in the courts limit their ability to gather and assess the relevant
evidence and to fairly evaluate the national interests revealed. In addition,
other countries may be justifiably reluctant to divulge certain sensitive infor-
mation through a private participant in a court proceeding, or without guar-
antees of confidentiality and use limitation. Standing alone, then, courts are
simply not equipped to receive and evaluate evidence of economic policy
2005] 1421
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United States antitrust laws' reach and to provide a bright-line test for
jurisdiction.2 3 The FTAIA makes no reference to comity and while the
legislative history24 suggests the FTAIA does not preclude courts from
invoking comity principles, the statute's silence on comity stands as an
unequivocal rejection of the jurisdictional rule-of-reason approach.25
Enacted as an exception to the Sherman Act, the FTAIA provides that:
Sections 1 to 7 of [title 15] shall not apply to conduct involving trade
or commerce (other than import trade or import commerce) with
foreign nations unless-
(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonable foresee-
able effect-
(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with
foreign nations, or on import trade or import commerce
with foreign nations; or (B) on export trade or export com-
merce with foreign nations, of a person engaged in such
trade or commerce in the United States; and
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of sections 1
to 7 of this title, other than this section. If sections 1 to 7 of this
title apply to such conduct only because of the operation of para-
graph (1)(B), then sections 1 to 7 of this title shall apply to such
conduct only for injury to export business in the Unites States.2 6
The FTAIA thus provides that the Sherman Act applies to conduct in-
volving commerce with foreign nations if and only if27
(1) that conduct has a direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable
effect-
(A) on domestic commerce or on import commerce or
interests of other nations, with the consequence that the comity principle
may frequently fail to achieve the desired equitable result. These problems
are particularly troublesome in the context of private antitrust actions against
foreign defendants, where there is no governmental participation to facilitate
consideration of alternative state interests.
(internal citations omitted).
23. United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 679 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing
legislative history for the point that FTAIA was enacted "'to more clearly establish when
antitrust liability attaches to international business activities"'); Den Norske Stats Oljesel-
skap As v. Heeremac Vof, 241 F.3d 420, 421 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1127
(2002); Ferromin Int'l Trade Corp. v. UCAR Int'l Corp., 153 F. Supp. 2d 700, 703 (E.D. Pa.
2001), vacated on other grounds sub nom., BHP N.Z. Ltd. v. UCAR Intern., Inc., 106 Fed.
App'x 138 (3d Cir. 2004); United Phosphorus Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 131 F. Supp. 2d
1003, 1008 (N.D. Ill. 2001) ("Congress enacted the FTAIA as an amendment to the Sher-
man Act to clarify the extra territorial reach of the federal antitrust laws."), affd, 322 F.3d
942 (7th Cir. 2003); see Edward D. Cavanagh, The FTAIA and Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Over Foreign Transactions Under the Antitrust Laws: The New Frontier in Antitrust Litiga-
tion, 56 SMU L. REv. 2151, 2158 (2003).
24. H.R. REP. No. 97-686, at 10, 13 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2498.
25. In re Ins. Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d 919, 932 (9th Cir. 1991) ("it is only in an unu-
sual case that comity will require abstention from the exercise of jurisdiction"), affd in
part, rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S.
764 (1993).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2000).
27. See Cavanagh, supra note 23, at 2157.
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(B) on export commerce with foreign nations of a person en-
gaged in export commerce in the United States; and
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under sections 1 to 7 of [the Sher-
man Act].
Put another way, the FTAIA carves out certain conduct-other than
import commerce-involving trade or commerce with foreign nations. 28
It then "carves back in" that conduct if (1) the conduct has a "direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" on the domestic com-
merce of the United States and (2) that domestic effect "gives rise to a
claim" under the Sherman Act.29 Again, the FTAIA itself does not illu-
minate either of the foregoing conditions' meaning.
B. CASE LAW DEVELOPMENT
In its early years, the FTAIA lay largely dormant. In the mid-nineties,
however, the statute became the focus of attention as the Antitrust Divi-
sion intensified its enforcement efforts against international cartels that,
in turn, spawned private treble-damages actions against foreign defend-
ants. In this series of cases, a new class of claimant emerged-a plaintiff,
typically foreign, suing foreign defendants on the basis of transactions
consummated wholly outside the United States.30 Foreign plaintiffs in
the foregoing factual scenario face two significant hurdles in addition to
those faced by all antitrust plaintiffs: (1) whether subject matter jurisdic-
tion is stripped by the FI'AIA and (2) whether foreign plaintiffs have
standing. 31
In turn, the FTAIA analysis focuses on two issues: (1) whether the con-
duct in question had a "direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable
effect" on United States commerce and (2) whether that anticompetitive
effect gives rise to a claim under the Sherman Act.32 As a threshold mat-
ter, it is unclear whether Congress, in enacting the FTAIA, intended to
codify existing case law or intended to prescribe new standards for deter-
mining when the Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct. 33 Neverthe-
less, courts have had little trouble implementing the "direct, substantial,
and reasonably foreseeable" standard. 34 They generally agree that the
FTAIA application turns on the situs of anticompetitive effects and not
on the situs of the offending conduct.35 Courts also agree that participa-
tion by American firms in the alleged conspiracy does not itself establish
28. Salil Mehra, Deterrence: The Private Remedy and International Antitrust Cases, 40
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 275, 290 (2002).
29. Id.
30. See Cavanagh, supra note 23, at 2159-60.
31. Id.
32. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2000).
33. Compare Kruman v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 284 F.3d 384, 395 (2d Cir. 2002) (saying
FTAIA merely codifies existing law) with Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. Heeremac
Vof, 241 F.3d 420, 421 (5th Cir. 2001) (saying FTAIA designed to clarify extra-territorial
reach of the Sherman Act), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1127 (2002).
34. See Cavanagh, supra note 23, at 2186-87.
35. Kruman, 284 F.3d at 395.
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an anticompetitive effect in the United States.36 At the same time, if a
wholly foreign conspiracy targets the United States market, the requisite
domestic effects will usually be found.37 The plaintiff bears the burden of
proving domestic effects, and mere intent to reduce competition in the
United States is insufficient to meet the "effect" standard.38
To prove "direct" effect, plaintiffs must prove a causal link between the
wrongful conduct and the anticompetitive effect suffered in the United
States.39 An effect is "direct" if it results in higher prices in the United
States or a reduction in United States output, including a reduction in
imports.40 An effect is also "direct" if there is significant diminution of
competition in the United States marketplace. 41 However, mere spillover
effects within the Unites States caused by a conspiracy targeted exclu-
sively at foreign markets are not sufficiently "direct" to satisfy the
FTAIA. 42 The anticompetitive effects on the domestic market must also
be "substantial;" mere ripple effects felt in the United States as a result of
anticompetitive conduct abroad are not sufficiently "substantial" to meet
FTAIA requirements. 43
As a general matter, if a conspiracy is aimed at both domestic and for-
eign markets, courts are inclined to find the first prong of the statute sat-
isfied.44 On the other hand, if the conspiracy is aimed solely at foreign
markets and excludes the United States, courts are less inclined to find
that the FTAIA has been satisfied.4 5 While it may be an overstatement
to say that the construction of section 6a(1) is now "well-settled," it is fair
to say that construction of section 6a(2) is where the most significant bat-
tles have been fought.
The FTAIA's second prong requires that the anticompetitive effect on
domestic commerce "gives rise to a claim" under the Sherman Act.46
Construction of the phrase "gives rise to a claim" in section 6a(2) has
proven most troublesome for the courts and has led to a circuit split. In
36. Id.
37. See United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1997).
38. Dee-K Enterps., Inc. v. Heveafil Snd. Bhd., 299 F.3d 281, 292 (4th Cir. 2002), cert.
denied, 539 U.S. 969 (2003).
39. United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 680 (9th Cir. 2004) ("an effect
is 'direct' if it follows as an immediate consequence of defendant's activity"); Info. Res.
Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 127 F. Supp. 2d 411, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Eurim-Pharm
GmbH v. Pfizer Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1002, 1106-07 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (finding no jurisdiction
under the FTAIA when "the link between the defendants' conduct abroad and the
price... in the United States is far from apparent").
40. Ferromin Int'l Trade Corp. v. UCAR Int'l, Inc., 153 F. Supp. 2d 700, 705 (E.D. Pa.
2001), vacated on other grounds sub nom., BHP New Zealand Ltd. v. UCAR Int'l, Inc., 106
Fed. App'x 138 (3d Cir. 2004).
41. See Coors Brewing Co. v. Miller Brewing Co., 889 F. Supp. 1394, 1397-98 (D. Colo.
1995).
42. Eurim-Pharm GmbH, 593 F. Supp. at 1106.
43. Dee-K Enters. Inc., 299 F.3d at 292.
44. See Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. Heeremac, Vof, 241 F.3d 420, 427 (5th Cir.
2001), cert. denied, U.S. 534 U.S. 1127 (2002).
45. Turicentro, S.A. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 303 F.3d 293, 298-99 (3d Cir. 2002).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2000).
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Den Norske Stats Qljeselskap As v. Heeremac Vof Statoil,4 7 the Fifth Cir-
cuit took a narrow view of section 6a(2). Plaintiff, Den Norske Stats
Oljesekskap As ("Statoil"), was a Norwegian company conducting busi-
ness exclusively in the North Sea. Statoil sued the defendants, alleging
that they had agreed to fix prices and allocate customers for heavy lift
barge services in the Gulf of Mexico and that the conspiracy led to higher
prices not only for purchasers of heavy lift-barge services in the Gulf of
Mexico but also for American consumers. 48 Statoil further alleged that
the market for heavy lift-barges services was global and that, due to the
conspiracy in the Gulf of Mexico, it was forced to pay supracompetitive
prices for heavy lift-barge services in the North Sea.49 The majority
found that the statute had not been satisfied because "the effect on
United States commerce-in this case, the higher prices paid by United
States companies for heavy lifting services in the Gulf of Mexico-must
give rise to the claim that [plaintiff] asserts. ' '50 That is, to come within the
exception to the FFAIA and to permit the claim to go forward under the
Sherman Act, the plaintiff needed to show that its injury stemmed from
injury to the domestic market-higher prices for heavy lift-barge services
in the Gulf of Mexico.5 1 Statoil could not show such an injury because
the higher prices that American companies paid for heavy lift-barge ser-
vices in the Gulf of Mexico did not give rise to Statoil's claim that it had
paid inflated prices for heavy lift-barge services in the North Sea.
52
On the other hand, the Second and D.C. Circuits both held that the
FIAIA did not bar claims by foreign plaintiffs based on transactions oc-
curring abroad. In Kruman v. Christie's International PLC,5 3 the Second
Circuit, reversing the lower court, held that claims by successful bidders
at Christie's and Sotheby's leading international-auction houses had en-
gaged in a worldwide conspiracy to fix the amount of the seller's commis-
sions or buyer's premiums could proceed under the Sherman Act, even
though all transactions had been consummated outside the United
States.54 In so ruling, the Second Circuit held that (1) the FTAIA merely
codified the prior law established in National Bank of Canada v. In-
terbank Card Association,55 and (2) the trial court had erred in holding
that plaintiffs suing on foreign transactions must show not only anticom-
petitive effects in the United States caused by the conspiracy but also that
"effects giving rise to jurisdiction also are the basis for the alleged in-
jury." 56 Put another way, the trial court erred in ruling that only those
47. 241 F.3d at 426-29.
48. Id. at 426-29.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 427.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. 284 F.3d 384, 384 (2d cir. 2002).
54. Id. at 389.
55. 666 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1981).
56. Kruman, 284 F.3d at 389-90.
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plaintiffs who suffer injury from the unlawful conspiracy domestic effects
might sue.
In National Bank of Canada, the Second Circuit had held that it is in-
cumbent on a plaintiff suing on a foreign transaction "to make clear the
linkage, if any, between the behavior objected to and any anticompetitive
consequences to United States commerce" and that "only those injuries
to United States commerce which reflect the anticompetitive effect either
of the violation or of anticompetitive acts made possible by the violation
constitute effects sufficient to confer jurisdiction. ' 57 Accordingly, the
court in Kruman held that, under National Bank of Canada, "anticompe-
titive conduct directed at foreign markets" is regulated by the Sherman
Act only if the conduct has the "effect" of causing "injury to domestic
commerce by (1) reducing the competitiveness of a domestic market or
(2) making possible anticompetitive conduct directed at domestic com-
merce.' ' 58 The court also concluded that subject matter jurisdiction ex-
isted under either prong of National Bank of Canada:
Conduct meeting the first prong of the National Bank of Canada test
would clearly have an effect on domestic commerce and give rise to a
claim under the Sherman Act because a plaintiff would have to show
that such conduct was directed at both domestic and foreign markets
and actually reduced the competitiveness of a domestic market.
Moreover, conduct meeting the second prong would satisfy the re-
quirements of subsection 2 of the FTAIA because it would have the
effect on domestic commerce of making possible anticompetitive
conduct that "gives rise to a claim" under the Sherman Act.59
The appellate court further found that the trial judge erroneously con-
strued section 6a(2) of the Sherman Act. 60 Like the Fifth Circuit, the trial
court had held that, under section 6a(2), foreign plaintiffs must show both
an anticompetitive effect on domestic commerce and that the same an-
ticompetitive effect conferring jurisdiction serves as the basis of their
claims. 61 The Second Circuit found that the lower court's construction of
section 6a(2) was at odds with the statute's plain meaning.62 The statute
requires only that the anticompetitive effect in question gives rise to a
claim; it is not necessary that the anticompetitive effect gives rise to this
particular plaintiffs claim.63
The Second Circuit also ruled that the trial court's construction of the
FTAIA would erroneously "conflate the FTAIA with the Clayton Act."' 64
According to the Second Circuit, "[tihe substantive provisions of the
Sherman Act determine what conduct by the defendant is actionable.
57. Nat'l Bank of Canada, 666 F.2d at 9.
58. Kruman, 284 F.3d at 399.
59. Id. at 401.
60. Id. at 396-401.
61. Kruman v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 129 F. Supp. 2d 620, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
62. Kruman, 284 F.3d at 400.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 397.
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The Clayton Act determines what injury a plaintiff must suffer in order to
bring suit."' 65 The FTAIA is an amendment to the Sherman Act, and the
Sherman Act prescribes substantive standards prohibiting certain conduct
by defendants. 66 On the other hand, the Clayton Act deals with the
plaintiff's right to sue or whether the plaintiff has suffered injury.67 Thus,
the FTAIA does not identify which plaintiffs may sue under the Clayton
Act, and "it would be inappropriate" for courts to "graft" onto to the
FIAIA the Clayton Act's injury requirement.68 "Conduct" as used in the
FIAIA refers only to acts that violate the Sherman Act. 69 The illegal
conduct in Kruman was not the imposition of the overcharge abroad but
rather the conspiracy's formation in the United States.
70
Nor, the court ruled, does section 6a(2) require that the anticompeti-
tive effects that create subject matter jurisdiction also be the basis of
plaintiff's injury.71 That interpretation would (1) be at odds with existing
Second Circuit case law, when in fact the FTAIA was intended to codify
that case law; (2) make jurisdiction turn on the issue of injury under the
Clayton Act when the F-IAIA deals only with the issue of conduct that
violates the Sherman Act; and (3) effectively rewrite 6a(2) by changing "a
claim" to "the claim."'72 The Second Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs
claimed sufficient effects on domestic commerce by alleging that the do-
mestic price-fixing agreement could have succeeded only with the foreign
price-fixing agreement.73 The offending conduct could be described in
two ways. One might characterize the illegal conduct in question as an
agreement to fix prices in both the foreign and domestic markets.74 The
illegal conduct affects domestic commerce because it includes acts
targeted at a domestic market. Alternatively, one may describe the of-
fending conduct as an agreement to fix prices in a foreign auction market
that made possible an agreement to fix prices in the domestic auction
market. 75 Because the foreign agreements made domestic price-fixing
agreements possible, the foreign agreements' effect gives rise to a claim
under the Sherman Act. The Second Circuit concluded that the FTAIA's
"unambiguous text" supported jurisdiction on the record before it.76
In Empagran, the D.C. Circuit reached the same result as the Second
Circuit but took another route to reach that result.77 It acknowledged
65. Id. at 398.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 397.
69. Id. at 398.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 399.
72. Id. at 399-400.
73. Id. at 401.
74. Id. at 401.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman LaRoche, Ltd., 315 F.3d 338 (D.C. Cir. 2003), va-
cated, 124 S. Ct. 2359 (2004).
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from the outset that section 6a(2) "does not plainly resolve this case."'78
It criticized the Fifth Circuit as being "overly rigid" in construing the
FTAIA and criticized the Second Circuit for reaching "too far in its view
of subject matter jurisdiction. ' 79 Turning to the FTAIA's legislative his-
tory, the D.C. Circuit noted that while there was some support for the
Fifth Circuit's position on section 6a(2) had some support, much of the
legislative history supported the broader Second Circuit's view.80 The
court also noted that Congress had cited Pfizer Inc. v. India81 with ap-
proval and had embraced the Supreme Court's view that barring foreign
claims could impair antitrust law's deterrent function.8 2 The D.C. Circuit
held that, under Pfizer Inc., the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction was
appropriate to preserve and enhance the deterrent function of the private
treble-damages remedy.83 The court observed that deterrence would be
severely undermined if foreign plaintiffs were barred from American
courts, leaving price-fixers free to use proceeds from foreign cartel activi-
ties to subsidize cartel behavior at home.8 4 The rewards from the illicit
foreign activities would more than offset any risk of liability for the do-
mestic conspiracy. 85 Congress's reliance in Pfizer in reporting on the
FrAIA persuaded the D.C. Circuit that the legislative history, on bal-
ance, supported exercising jurisdiction in Empagran.8 6
III. EMPAGRAN I
A. FTAIA JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Empagran I to resolve the
circuit split on the FTAIA's construction, specifically the extent to which
the domestic-injury exception to the FTAIA's general-exclusionary rule
applied to the facts before the court.87 However, those who had hoped
for a definitive analysis of the FTAIA are likely to be disappointed. Jus-
tice Breyer's narrowly crafted opinion vacating the D.C. Circuit's deci-
sion to uphold jurisdiction made no attempt to parse the statute and held
that the FTAIA precludes courts from exercising subject matter jurisdic-
tion over antitrust claims by foreign plaintiffs alleging unlawful conduct
that "significantly and adversely affects both customers outside the
United States and customers within the United States,"88 where "the ad-
verse foreign effect is independent of any adverse domestic effect,"'8 9 that
is, "the conduct's domestic effect did not help bring about that foreign
78. Id. at 350.
79. Id. at 341.
80. Id. at 352-54.
81. 434 U.S. 308 (1978).





87. Empagran 1, 124 S. Ct. 2359, 2364 (2004).
88. Id. at 2366.
89. Id.
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injury."90
The Court's rationale was two-fold. First, citing principles of prescrip-
tive comity, the Court held that ambiguous statutes, such as the FTAIA,
should ordinarily be construed so as to "avoid unreasonable interference
with the sovereign authority of other nations." 91 While the Court ac-
knowledged that applying American antitrust laws to foreign conduct
could potentially interfere with a foreign nation's ability to regulate its
own commerce, the court nevertheless concluded that the Sherman Act
may be invoked to the extent Congress sought to redress domestic anti-
trust injury caused by foreign conduct. 92 At the same time, the Court
determined that it would be unreasonable to apply American antitrust
law to foreign conduct, where, as here, the foreign conduct causes foreign
injury independent of domestic injury, and that foreign injury alone gives
rise to claims by foreign plaintiffs.93 In such cases, American law may not
supersede a foreign nation's determination of to how to best protect its
citizens.94 Further bolstering its comity rationale, the Court cited amicus
briefs filed by several foreign governments arguing that permitting for-
eign plaintiffs to invoke the treble-damages remedy "would unjustifiably
permit their citizens to bypass their own less generous remedial schemes,
thereby upsetting the balance of competing considerations that their own
domestic antitrust laws embody."
95
Second, the Court found that no case decided before the FTAIA's
adoption supported exercising of federal jurisdiction on the record before
it. The court also found that neither the FTAIA itself nor its legislative
history supported construing of the FTAIA to expand the Sherman Act's
reach of in cases involving foreign commerce. 96 The Court specifically
rejected plaintiffs' argument that as long as the conduct at issue has do-
mestic effects giving rise to "a claim" on behalf of someone-concededly
not these plaintiffs-the FTAIA does not bar Sherman Act jurisdiction.
Although the Court conceded that plaintiffs' "reading [of the FTAIA] is
the more natural reading of the statutory language," 97 it nevertheless
ruled that considerations of comity and history make clear that plaintiffs'
expansive reading of the FTAIA is inconsistent with the statute's basic
intent to limit rather than to expand the reach of the United States anti-
trust laws in cases involving foreign commerce. 98 Accordingly, the Court
found that defendant's reading of the statute's language is correct" and
"that reading furthers the statute's basic purpose, it reflects considera-
tions of comity, and it is consistent with the Sherman Act history." 99
90. Id. at 2372.
91. Id. at 2366.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 2367.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 2371.
97. Id.




At the same time, the Court repeatedly emphasized that its holding
was limited to the case's facts and addressed only those situations in
which the anticompetitive conduct "independently caused foreign injury;
that is, the conduct's domestic effects did not help bring about foreign
injury." 100 The Court suggested, but did not decide, that American courts
may have jurisdiction over foreign claims, if those claims are dependent
upon, rather than independent of domestic harm.101 The issue whether
there was any linkage between foreign injury and domestic harm caused
by foreign conduct was left for the D.C. Circuit to decide on remand.
At first blush, the opinion, especially its invocation of comity as the
principal ground for denying subject matter jurisdiction, is somewhat
mystifying. After all, the FTAIA was enacted, at least in part, to clarify
the circumstances in which United States antitrust laws would apply to
foreign conduct by eliminating comity from the calculus. Only if one
were present at the oral argument or had had an opportunity to review a
transcript of the proceedings would the Court's tack make sense.
The Court seemed disinclined to entertain arguments dissecting the
FAIA. Justice Scalia made short-shrift of petitioner's argument that the
requisite effect on the United States economy had not been established
and invited argument on section 6a(2).10 2 Justice Souter quickly cut off
that discussion by suggesting that "the textual argument [is] in-effect
a-a draw" and that comity would be the proper mode of analysis, while
at the same time recognizing that comity had not been raised.103 Peti-
tioners' counsel seized this opening and articulated the prescriptive com-
ity argument that became the cornerstone of the Court's unanimous
opinion.10 4
The alternative holding, which also avoids detailed analysis of the
FTAIA, proceeds in a classic syllogism. First, before the FTAIA, the for-
eign claims asserted in a suit would not be cognizable under the Sherman
Act.105 Second, in enacting the FTAIA, Congress did not intend to ex-
pand subject matter jurisdiction under the Sherman Act but rather to nar-
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Transcript of Oral Argument at 10-11, Empagran 1, 124 S. Ct. 2359 (No. 03-724),
available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-argumentargument-transcrips/02-724.pdf.
103. Id. at 12-13.
104. Id. at 12-13. Counsel for defendants stated:
Mr. Shapiro: Well, there is a kind of comity that Justice Scalia referred to in
the Hartford case that we think is raised here, and that is comity bearing-
comity among nations, not judicial comity where the judges weigh various
and sundry factors, but it's a rule of interpretation that-that discourages
interpretations of law, where you have two interpretations that are available,
you pick the interpretation that is most consistent with international law and
which avoids antagonizing our allies and our trading partners. And that con-
cept is very much before the court here, and I think it argues very much infavor of the narrower interpretation, particularly because Congress was ex-
pecting that wholly foreign transactions, that's the term used in the HouseReport, would be litigation in foreign nations, and-and our-allies and
trading partners.
105. Empagran 1, 124 S. Ct. at 2371.
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row it.106 Therefore, because the claims asserted were not cognizable
before the FTAIA's passage and because the FTAIA did not augment
federal antitrust jurisdiction, the foreign claims at issue are not now cog-
nizable in American courts.10 7 By using this line of reasoning, the Court
obviated the need to provide a detailed interpretation of the FTAIA gen-
erally, and it eliminated the need specifically to determine whether the
phrase "a claim" in section 6a(2) should be read literally, as the plaintiffs
had argued, or more narrowly as "this plaintiff's claim," as the defendants
had argued. Still, the Court emphasized that one should not read literally
the phrase "a claim."'108 As noted above, the Court did concede that
plaintiffs' reading is "the more natural" one but ultimately held that con-
sidering comity and history demonstrates plaintiffs' broad construction of
the FTAIA would conflict with the statute's intent. 10 9
After taking a somewhat circuitous route, the court thus comes down
squarely on the Fifth Circuit's side and against the Second and D.C. Cir-
cuits in the FTAIA debates. That ruling, in turn, is consistent with most
of district-court cases decided before Kruman and Empagran. Curiously,
the Court chose not to factor into its decision the concession of the plain-
tiff's counsel that recovery by foreign plaintiffs under the United States
antitrust laws would be barred if their home countries had credible anti-
trust regimes.' 10 Although that concession would not have been outcome
determinative on the record before the Court, it is nevertheless of consid-
erable significance on the issue of the reach of United States antitrust
laws to foreign conduct.
B. STANDING
While the standing issue had been briefed by the parties in the Su-
preme Court and had been addressed in detail by the D.C. Circuit, the
Supreme Court declined to reach that question. This is not surprising, for
while standing is a threshold issue distinct from subject matter jurisdic-
tion, most courts have found resolution of the FTAIA issue to be disposi-
tive or, having dealt with the jurisdictional issue, remanded the case for
further consideration of the standing question. Still, in the interest of ef-
ficiency and in order more fully to develop the law on the rights of for-
eign purchasers to sue under the United States antitrust laws, the
Supreme Court could have and should have decided the standing issue.
In deed, resolution of foreign claims under the standing doctrine may




109. Id. at 2372.
110. Transcript of Oral Argument at 45-46, Empagran I, 124 S. Ct. 2359 (No. 03-724)
("We would reject claims from places like Australia and Canada and the like, that's right.
If they have any sort of regime that they have decided to build up, if they've enacted into




below,"' standing principles and the related doctrines of antitrust injury
and the direct purchaser rule preclude claims by foreign purchasers based
on transactions that occur outside the United States.
IV. EMPAGRAN H
The Supreme Court directed the D.C. Circuit on remand to evaluate
plaintiffs' alternate theory of Sherman Act jurisdiction that "because vita-
mins are fungible and readily transportable, without an adverse effect
(i.e., higher prices in the United States) the sellers could not have main-
tained their international price-fixing arrangement and respondents
would not have suffered their foreign injury." 112 Plaintiffs articulated
their argument as follows:
Because the appellees' product (vitamins) was fungible and globally
marketed, they were able to sustain super-competitive prices abroad
only by maintaining super-competitive prices in the United States as
well. Otherwise, overseas purchasers would have purchased bulk vi-
tamins at lower prices either directly from United States sellers or
from arbitrageurs selling vitamins imported from the United States,
thereby preventing the appellees from selling abroad at the inflated
prices. Thus, the super-competitive pricing in the United States
"gives rise to" the foreign super-competitive prices from which the
appellants claim injury. 113
The D.C. Circuit rejected plaintiffs' alternate argument. 1 4 While not-
ing that plaintiffs had made a plausible case of "but for" causation linking
anticompetitive effects in the United States (higher prices for vitamins) to
plaintiffs' foreign injury, the court ruled that "but for" causation "is sim-
ply not sufficient to bring anti-competitive conduct within the FTAIA ex-
ception."' 15 Rather, the statutory language-"gives rise to"-demands a
direct causal relationship between anticompetitive effects in the United
States and injury suffered abroad. 1 6 Accordingly, the appropriate stan-
dard under the FTAIA is proximate cause. 117
The court reasoned that a proximate-cause standard was consistent
with principles of prescriptive comity relied on by the Supreme Court in
Empagran I under which ambiguous statutes must be construed narrowly
so as to "avoid unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of
the other nations."" 8 Permitting jurisdiction to turn on a more lenient
"but for" test would be inconsistent with prescriptive comity and open
the door to interference with the prerogative of other nations "to safe-
111. See, infra notes 129-206 and accompanying text.
112. Empagran 1, 124 S. Ct. at 2372.
113. Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd., 417 F.3d 1267, 1270 (D.C. Cir. 2005)(citing appellants' brief at 15-21) [hereinafter Empagran I1].
114. Id. at 1270-71.
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guard their own citizens from anticompetitive activity within their own
borders." 119
The court then found that plaintiffs had failed to meet the proximate-
cause standard. 120 First, while higher prices in the United States may
have facilitated defendants' anticompetitive scheme to raise prices to for-
eign buyers, that alone establishes at most "but for" causation. 121 Plain-
tiffs had failed to allege that the United States effects of defendants'
conduct proximately caused plaintiffs' harm.122 In so holding, the court
further stated that it was not enough for the plaintiffs to allege a global
market in vitamins; the FTAIA requires plaintiffs to show that "the U.S.
effects of the [defendant's] conduct give rise to their claims. 1' 23 In this
case, it was the foreign effects of defendants' foreign conduct that directly
gave rise to plaintiffs' claims.1 24 Moreover, proof that defendants could
foresee the anticompetitive effect of their illegal conduct in the United
States or of foreign purchases does not establish the requisite proximate
cause. 125 Nor would it make any difference if defendants' anticompeti-
tive acts were intended to manipulate United States trade1 26 Given that
the foreign injury caused by defendants' conduct and the United States
effects of defendants' conduct cannot be directly linked, the foreign in-
jury was not "inextricably bound up" with United States restraints of
trade.127 Thus, the judgment below was affirmed.1 28
V. WHAT NEXT?
A. THE FVIAIA
In the wake of the Supreme Court's ruling in Empagran I, the D.C.
Circuit's about-face in Empagran II on the issue of subject matter juris-
diction is not surprising. As former Assistant Attorney General John
Shenefield observed some five months before the decision on remand,
the framework for any decision in Empagran II had been embedded like
the da Vinci Code in Empagran 1.129 Even though the Court in Em-
pagran I expressly limited its opinion to situations in which the adverse
foreign effect is independent of any adverse domestic effect, the same
concerns that drove the Empagran I decision compelled the identical re-












129. John H. Shenefield, Address at the New York State Bar Association Antitrust Sec-
tion (Jan. 27, 2005).
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As discussed, 130 the Supreme Court denied subject matter jurisdiction
in Empagran I on two grounds: (1) under principles of prescriptive com-
ity, ambiguous statutes should be construed so as to avoid conflicts with
foreign law; and (2) the Sherman Act would not have reached the con-
duct in question before the FTAIA's enactment, and because the FTAIA
was certainly not intended to expand the antitrust law's reach, the Sher-
man Act is inapplicable to the same conduct after the FTAIA's
enactment.
Prescriptive comity concerns apply equally under plaintiffs' alternative
theory. At issue are transactions consummated abroad by foreign plain-
tiffs. For United States courts to assert jurisdiction over these claims
under an admittedly ambiguous statute would be to supplant foreign na-
tions in their primary role of protecting their consumers and create pre-
cisely the kind of "unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority
of other nations" that the Supreme Court said should be avoided. 131
Opening the courthouse doors to foreign purchasers would amount to an
act of "legal imperialism"' 132 that Congress did not intend, and that would
undermine the antitrust enforcement policies and remedies of foreign
sovereigns.
Likewise, concern in Empagran I about an overly expansive construc-
tion of the FTAIA applies with equal force to Empagran II. Clearly,
plaintiffs' alternative theory would expand antitrust jurisdiction, since
they have cited no decisions that upheld Sherman Act jurisdiction over
foreign transactions on their revamped "but for" theory before the
FTAIA's enactment. 133 Given that the FTAIA was not intended to ex-
pand Sherman Act jurisdiction, the inescapable conclusion is that the
FTAIA does not permit Sherman Act jurisdiction or plaintiffs' "but for"
theory. Similarly, the fact that there may be some linkage between for-
eign and domestic markets does not address concerns expressed by the
Supreme Court and by the Antitrust Division that allowing United States
courts to entertain claims by foreign plaintiffs based on foreign transac-
tions would discourage applications for amnesty and thereby undermine
the deterrent function of antitrust by making it more difficult to detect
antitrust violations.134 In short, a "but for" standard of causation for sub-ject matter jurisdiction under the FTAIA does not address concerns
about (1) comity, (2) deterrence under the United States antitrust laws,
or (3) international antitrust enforcement, all of which were central to the
rationale in Empagran L
130. See supra notes 87-99 and accompanying text.
131. Empagran I, 124 S. Ct. 2359, 2366 (2004).
132. Id. at 2369.
133. The Court of Appeals in Empagran H pointed out that plaintiffs "acknowledged at
oral argument... [that] 'but for' causation between domestic effects and the foreign injury
claim is simply not sufficient to bring anti-competitive conduct within the FTAIA excep-
tion." Empagran H, 417 F.3d at 1267.
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What, then, should the causation standard be? Again, Empagran I
contains the clue, pointing in the direction of a proximate-cause test. The
Court cited Industria Siciliana Asfalti, Bitumi, S.P.A. v. Exxon Research
& Engineering Co., 135 in which the district court permitted an Italian
plaintiff to sue an American defendant based solely on an injury suffered
abroad. According to the district court, United States jurisdiction was
proper in that case because plaintiff's foreign injury was "inextricably
bound up with the domestic restraints of trade. 1136 The district court also
concluded that plaintiff "was injured by reason of an alleged restraint of
our trade. ' 137 Clearly, the quoted language suggests a proximate cause
standard rather than a "but for" test.
Moreover, FTAIA's language itself strongly suggests a proximate-cause
standard. 138 First, section 6a(1) requires that the foreign conduct have
more than some spillover impact on the United States-it requires a "di-
rect, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect" on domestic com-
merce.139 Section 6a(2) provides that foreign conduct's United States
effect "gives rise to" claims by foreign plaintiffs. 140 The effect on domes-
tic commerce, then. must be the proximate cause of the foreign plaintiff's
injury. The impact on domestic commerce must follow "as an immediate
consequence of defendant's activity.' 41 Incidental "but for" linkage be-
tween foreign and domestic markets does not suffice.
142
135. No. 75 CIV. 5828-CSH, 1977 WL 1353 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). Industria Siciliana Asfalti
Bitumi is an obscure, unreported district-court decision that has taken center-stage in the
debate over the limits the FI'AIA has placed on Sherman Act jurisdiction in matters in-
volving foreign commerce. Plaintiff ISAB was an Italian oil refiner that sought engineer-
ing services in connection with the construction of its refinery. Id. at *1. ISAB received
bids from two American firms, Universal Oil Products Co. ("UOP") and Exxon Research
& Engineering Co. ("ERE"), a subsidiary of Exxon Corp. Id. ISAB alleged unlawful co-
ercive reciprocal dealing by ERE. Id. at *2. ISAB claimed that even though UOP's bid
was nearly a million dollars lower ERE's bid, it had nevertheless been coerced into ac-
cepting the higher bid to obtain a more beneficial refining contract with ERE. Id. ERE
moved to dismiss on standing grounds, alleging that ISAB was neither a competitor nor a
customer in the United States domestic market. Id. at *3.
The court denied the motion, noting that two competitive evils are associated with reci-
procity: foreclosure of rivals in a given market and anticompetitive forcing of a product or
service on the buyer that the buyer did not want or wanted on different terms. Id. at *3-11.
The court found that when coercion is present, the legal distinction between these two
types of antitrust injuries disappear because the anticompetitive forcing flows directly from
foreclosure of the market, rendering the two types of injuries indistinguishable. Id. at *10.
Thus, the foreign injury is "inextricably bound up with the domestic restraints of trade
which have enabled the defendant to enforce the reciprocal transaction upon the plaintiff."
Id. at 11.
136. Id. (emphasis added).
137. Id. at 12.
138. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2000).
139. Id. § 6a(1).
140. Id. § 6a(2).
141. United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 680 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing
Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc. 504 U.S. 607, 618 (1992)).
142. Although no court before Empagran II addressed "but for" causation in the
FTAIA context and Empagran II itself cites precious little case law, courts have repeatedly
held that "but for" causation is insufficient as a matter of law to prove the fact of injury.
Courts have articulated the causation standard many ways, including "material cause of the
injury," Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 114 n.9 (1969), injury
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Nor, under the FTAIA, does the existence of an allegedly "globalized"
market for a price-fixed product conclusively establish United States ju-
risdiction over foreign transactions. The conspirators' ability to maintain
supracompetitive prices in the United States might have facilitated de-
fendants' scheme to charge supracompetitive prices abroad. Even if that
was the case, plaintiffs have still established at most "but for" causation-
an indirect link between price levels in the United States and prices actu-
ally paid abroad-rather than the direct connection that the statute con-
templates. In any event, it would be unwise as a policy matter to force
district courts on a case-by-case basis to "ramble through the wilds of
economic theory" 143 to determine both whether and the degree to which
particular foreign and domestic markets are interlinked.
Second, as a policy matter, proof that foreign and domestic markets are
interlinked in some way does not establish that a particular foreign plain-
tiff's claim arose from an adverse effect on United States domestic com-
merce. Rejecting the reasoning of the D.C. Circuit in Empagran and the
Second Circuit in Kruman, the Supreme Court made clear that the for-
eign plaintiff must establish that the conspiracy's effect on United States
commerce caused its injuries, and it is not enough to show that the con-
spiracy had harmed someone (other than the plaintiff) in the United
States.1
44
In the end, the reasoning of the D.C. Circuit and the Second Circuit
proves too much and would render jurisdictional limitations meaningless.
A simple hypothetical demonstrates the flaw in these courts' rationales.
Assume there is a worldwide conspiracy to fix the price of vitamins. All
the conspirators are foreign companies who sell vitamins in the United
States and elsewhere throughout the world. A foreign plaintiff who pur-
chased allegedly price-fixed vitamins abroad sues in the United States
courts. If the effects in the United States "give rise" to the foreign plain-
tiff's claim because the market is "globalized," then the effects in Japan
or Germany would also "give rise" to the same plaintiff's claim in those
countries. Defendants would then be subject to jurisdiction on this same
claim in courts throughout the world. Such a result simply makes no
sense because it would render international boundaries meaningless. 145
"not shown to be attributable to other causes," Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327
U.S. 251, 264 (1946), and "substantial" cause of the injury, Motive Parts Warehouse v. Facet
Enter., 774 F.2d 380, 389 (10th Cir. 1985). While the formulations vary, the bottom line is
the same-the test for fact of injury is more rigorous than simple "but for" causation. See
2 PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW 338a, at 317-21 (2d ed. 2000) (saying
antitrust violation must be "substantial" and "material cause" of plaintiff's injury).
143. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609-10 n.10 (1972).
144. Empagran 1, 124 S. Ct. 2359, 2371-72 (2004).
145. As the Court in Empagran I asked rhetorically: "[wihy should American law sup-
plant, for example, Canada's or Great Britain's or Japan's own determination about how
best to protect Canadian or British or Japanese customers from anticompetitive conduct
engaged in [in] significant part by Canadian or British or Japanese or other foreign compa-
nies?" Id. at 2367.
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In short, John Shenefield was right-the blueprint for the decision in
Empagran H already existed in Empagran L It seems implausible that a
unanimous Court, after undertaking a detailed analysis of the policies un-
derlying the FTAIA and after concluding that jurisdiction was lacking,
would have remanded the matter to the circuit court with the expectation
of a different result. Rather, it is more likely that the Supreme Court was
simply giving the D.C. Circuit a roadmap to correct its error and save
face.
The early returns support the Shenefield position. In Sniado v. Bank
Austria AG,146 the Second Circuit, after the Supreme Court's grant of
certiorari and remand with instructions to review its earlier decision up-
holding jurisdiction in light of Empagran,147 vacated its prior order and
affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint. Plaintiff in Bank
Austria, an American citizen, had alleged that (1) he had been charged
supracompetitive fees to exchange Euro-zone currencies and (2) the ex-
cessive fees at issue, all of which had been paid in Europe, had been
caused by an illegal price-fixing conspiracy among European banks.
148
Plaintiff sought to walk into United States court through the door left
open in Empagran by arguing that his injury in Europe depended on the
foreign conspiracy's effect on domestic commerce.1 49 Nevertheless, the
Second Circuit ruled that "plaintiff's amended complaint, liberally con-
strued to the outer limits of reasonableness," failed to support his argu-
ments for exercising jurisdiction. 150 Specifically, the complaint failed to
allege that currency-conversion fees had reached supra-competitive levels
in the United States.15 ' Nor did it allege that the foreign conspiracy's
adverse effect on domestic commerce was the "but for" cause of his in-
jury in Europe.1 52 The court also found that attempts to allege that the
injury suffered in Europe depended on the foreign conspiracy's adverse
effect on domestic commerce were "too conclusory to avert dismissal.'
' 53
The court further pointed out that the district court was right to rule that,
under section 6a(2) of the FTAIA, the foreign conspiracy's adverse effect
on domestic commerce must give rise to this particular plaintiff's claim
and not someone else's claim. 154
In BHP New Zealand Ltd. v. UCAR International, Inc., 55 which in-
volved an alleged worldwide cartel to fix prices and allocate territories for
graphite electrodes, the Third Circuit, following Empagran, vacated a dis-
trict court order that dismissed claims based on foreign purchases but
upheld claims based on sales that had been invoiced in the United States.
146. 378 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 2004).
147. Bank Aus. AG v. Sniado, 124 S. Ct. 2870, 2871 (2004).
148. Sniado, 378 F.3d at 212.
149. Id.




154. Id. at 212.
155. 106 Fed. App'x. 138 (3d Cir. 2004).
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The Third Circuit ruled that the district court, "should it deem it neces-
sary or helpful, may give the parties the opportunity to present evidence
as to whether the alleged anticompetitive conduct's domestic effects were
linked to the alleged foreign harm."'1 56
On the other hand, the court in MM Global Services, Inc. v. Dow
Chemical Co.157 upheld Sherman Act jurisdiction in the wake of Em-
pagran L Plaintiffs, distributors of defendant's chemical products to end-
users in India, alleged that defendant imposed resale price maintenance
on their sales in India to protect against price erosion in the United States
and other countries. 158 Defendant sought dismissal, arguing that under
Empagran, a foreign plaintiff must show that the anticompetitive effects
on domestic commerce gave rise to their injuries, whereas in this case
plaintiffs were arguing the opposite-that their foreign injuries had an
effect on domestic commerce. 159 Misreading the Supreme Court, the dis-
trict court agreed with the plaintiffs that nothing in Empagran I pre-
cluded Sherman Act jurisdiction over "domestic effects 'flowing' to and
from foreign effects" and denied defendant's motion to dismiss.' 60
Sherman Act jurisdiction by foreign purchasers in foreign transactions
was also upheld in In re Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litigation.16 '
In that case, plaintiffs alleged that defendants were part of a global con-
spiracy to fix the price of and allocate markets for monosodium gluta-
mate ("Monosodium Glutamate"). 162 Plaintiffs contended that the
global conspiracy "exerted direct and substantial effects on United States
trade and commerce" by inflating prices paid by purchasers in the United
States. 163 Plaintiffs' theory was essentially a carbon copy of that
presented in Empagran II:
According to Plaintiffs, Defendants fixed United States prices and
controlled United States markets not merely to capture cartel profits
in the United States, but also to allow the cartel to be effective any-
where in the world. Because Monosodium Glutamate and nucleo-
tides are fungible commodities, Defendants and their co-conspirators
allegedly "knew that their conspiracy would not succeed unless they
coordinated their prices and market shares in markets across the
world." Thus, Defendants allegedly included the United States in
the cartel precisely to extract cartel profits from purchasers around
the world without risk of arbitrage. 164
Plaintiffs' alleged injury is that they purchased overpriced Monosodium
Glutamate and nucleotides abroad because Defendants' unlawful con-
156. Id. at 143.
157. 329 F. Supp. 2d 337 (D. Conn. 2004).
158. Id. at 339.
159. Id. at 342.
160. Id. at 342-43.
161. No. Civ. 00MDL1328(PAM), 2005 WL 1080790 (D. Minn. May, 2, 2005).
162. Id. at *1.
163. Id.
164. Id. (internal citations omitted).
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spiracy prevented them from buying competitively priced Monosodium
Glutamate and nucleotides from the United States.
In addition, plaintiffs alleged that their injuries abroad were "inextrica-
bly intertwined with the injury that defendants inflicted on the United
States market" in that the supracompetitive prices paid in the United
States were "directly and substantially linked with the prices plaintiffs
paid" abroad and that defendants' illegal conduct deliberately prevented
plaintiffs from purchasing Monosodium Glutamate in the United
States165
Accepting all these allegations as true, the court upheld subject matter
jurisdiction under the Sherman Act and declined to dismiss the com-
plaint.166 In ruling as it did, the court erred in at least four respects. First,
as the D.C. Circuit held in Empagran II, allegations establishing that
United States and foreign markets are interlinked on pricing establishes
at most "but for" causation and fails to meet the more stringent proxi-
mate-cause standard that the statute requires.167
Second, the court misconceived the meaning of the phrase "foreign in-
jury that is inextricably bound up with domestic restraints of trade.' 68
The Monsodium Glutamate court used that phrase to mean simply that
United States prices are interlinked with prices abroad.' 69 Justice Breyer
in Empagran I had something else in mind in using this terminology: for-
eign injury is inextricably bound up with domestic restraints of trade
when the foreign conduct harms domestic plaintiffs and the adverse do-
mestic effects directly cause the harm suffered by foreign plaintiffs.'70 In
Industria Siciliana Asfalti, for example, the foreign injury was "inextrica-
bly bound up with domestic restraints of trade because a reciprocal tying
agreement effected the exclusion of the American rival of one defendant
[from Italy], resulting in higher prices [to the foreign plaintiffs].' 171
Third, the court found that United States courts must entertain anti-
trust claims of foreign plaintiffs to assure an adequate level of deterrence
against international cartel behavior. 172 That view is clearly at odds with
the Supreme Court's holding in Empagran I that, under principles of pre-
scriptive comity, American courts should avoid potential interference
with the sovereign authority of other nations.' 73
Fourth, in upholding the complaint, the court in Monosodium Gluta-
mate focused on the fact that the complaint alleged that foreign injury is
"inextricably intertwined" with domestic injury and that the domestic an-
ticompetitive effect and a direct causal relationship with foreign injury.174
165. Id. at *4.
166. Id. at *1, 8.
167. See id. at *3.
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. See Empagran H, 417 F.3d 1267, 1268-69 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
171. Id.
172. Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litig., 2005 WL 1080790, at *7.
173. Empagran 1, 124 S. Ct. 2359, 2366 (2004).
174. Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litig., 2005 WL 1080790, at *7.
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While it is true that on a motion to dismiss a court should accept as true
the allegations in the complaint,175 it is also true that a court need not
accept mere conclusory allegations not supported by underlying facts.176
Empagran I dealt directly with the issue of subject matter jurisdiction; it
was not a pleading case wherein one could cure defective allegations of
jurisdiction simply by invoking a talismanic phrase. Were that the case,
motions to dismiss would cease to be useful litigation tools. Courts may
not honor form over substance in adjudicating Rule 12 motions.
B. STANDING
In addition to establishing subject matter jurisdiction, a foreign plaintiff
suing on a foreign transaction must show that it has standing to prosecute
an antitrust claim in federal court. The standing question is conceptually
separate from the question of subject matter jurisdiction, and courts have
recognized that a finding of subject matter jurisdiction does not foreclose
a challenge on standing grounds. 177 Still, the standing issue in the context
of foreign claimants has not received the attention it deserves. The case
law on the standing of foreign plaintiffs to sue under the FTAIA is sparse,
and it is noteworthy that the Supreme Court studiously avoided the issue
in Empagran 1.178 The standing question is no less difficult than the issue
of subject matter jurisdiction. Standing analysis requires that courts ex-
amine the fundamental goals and limits of antitrust enforcement to assure
that the antitrust laws are used to address only those problems that Con-
gress intended to resolve. 179 That task's complexity may explain why
courts have generally been reluctant to tackle the standing issue and par-
ticularly why the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit declined to enter
the fray in Empagran I and Empagran II respectively.
Like subject matter jurisdiction, standing is a threshold question in any
antitrust suit. Antitrust standing is governed by section 4 of the Clayton
175. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
176. See, e.g., Spanish Broad. Sys. v. Clear Channel Comm'n, Inc., 376 F.3d 1065, 1078
(11th Cir. 2004) ("Conclusory allegations that the defendant violated the antitrust laws and
plaintiff was injured thereby will not survive a motion to dismiss if not supported by facts
constituting a legitimate claim for relief.") (internal quotations omitted).
177. Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman LaRoche, Ltd., 315 F.3d 338, 357-58 (D.C. Cir.
2003), vacated, 124 S. Ct. 2359 (2004).
178. Empagran 1, 124 S. Ct. at 2359. Similarly, the D.C. Circuit in Empagran HI de-
clined to address the standing issue. Empagran II, 417 F.3d 1267, 1267 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
179. In HyPoint Tech., Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 949 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir. 1991),
the Court stated:
Antitrust standing... is the glue that cements each suit with the purposes of
the antitrust laws, and prevents abuses of those laws. The requirement of
anti-trust standing ensures that antitrust litigants use the laws to prevent an-
ticompetitive action and makes certain that they will not be able to recover
under the antitrust laws when the action challenged would tend to promote
competition in the economic sense. Antitrust laws reflect considered policies
regulating economic matters. The antitrust standing requirement makes cer-
tain that the laws are used only to deal with the economic problems whose
solutions these policies were intended to effect.
See AREEDA, supra, note 142, at 337, at 305-06.
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Act, 80 which provides that "any person who shall be injured in his busi-
ness or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws
may sue therefore ... and shall recover threefold the damages by him
sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."1 81
Notwithstanding the Clayton Act's breadth, courts have repeatedly held
that the antitrust laws will not remedy all "foreseeable ripples of injury
which may be shown to reach individual employees, stockholders or con-
sumers." 182 In Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, the Supreme Court
stated that an "antitrust violation may be expected to cause ripples of
harm to flow through the Nation's economy; but despite the broad word-
ing of § 4, there is a point beyond which the wrongdoer should not be held
liable.'u8 3 Accordingly, courts will not permit antitrust plaintiffs whose
claims are derivative, remote, or consequential to proceed.'8 4
The key tasks in the standing investigation are locating the boundaries
beyond which recovery will not be permitted and determining whether
the particular antitrust plaintiff before the court falls outside those
boundaries. Courts have struggled with these tasks. Over the years, the
lower courts have developed several bright-line tests for antitrust stand-
ing. The earliest standard, created by the Third Circuit, was the direct-
injury test, a tort-based proximate-cause rule. a85 Later, the Ninth Circuit
introduced the "target area" test under which a plaintiff must show it was
"within that area of the economy . ..endangered by a breakdown of
competitive conditions" and that the illegal practices were aimed at it.186
A similar standard, denominated the zone-of-interest test, was developed
by the Sixth Circuit.' 87 Rethinking its earlier standard, the Third Circuit
introduced a multifactored factual-matrix test in 1976.188
Although the Supreme Court acknowledged these various standing
tests, it declined to endorse any of them.l8 9 Nor did it provide any signifi-
cant guidance on antitrust standing until its 1983 decision in Associated
General Contractors.190 In that case, the Court eschewed the litmus tests
developed by various circuits and enunciated a multifactored standard.
The Court said that antitrust standing turns on an analysis of five factors:
(1) the causal connection between the antitrust violation and the harm to
180. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000).
181. Id.
182. See, e.g., Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183, 187 (2d Cir. 1970).
183. 457 U.S. 465, 476-77 (1982) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
184. Id.
185. Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704, 709 (3d Cir. 1910).
186. Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 1955) (internal
quotations omitted); see also Calderone Enters. Corp. v. United Artist Theatre Circuit,
Inc., 454 F.2d 1292, 1296 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972).
187. Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142, 1148 (6th Cir. 1975).
188. Cromar Co. v. Nuclear Materials Corp. & Equip., 543 F.2d 501, 506 (3d Cir. 1976).
189. Blue Shield of Cal. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 477 n.12 (1982) ("We have no
occasion here to evaluate the relative utility of any of these possibly conflicting approaches
toward the problem of remote antitrust injury.").




the plaintiff and whether the harm was intended; (2) the nature of the
injury, including whether the plaintiff was a consumer or competitor in
the relevant market; (3) the directness of the injury and whether the dam-
ages are too speculative; (4) the likelihood of duplicative recovery; and
(5) whether there are more direct victims.191
In formulating this multifactored test, the Court drew heavily on its
earlier decisions in Brunswick'92 and Illinois Brick.193 In Brunswick, the
Supreme Court held that to recover under the antitrust laws, a plaintiff
must establish more than a violation of the antitrust laws and a causal
nexus between that violation and the alleged injuries. 194 The plaintiff
must prove "antitrust injury," that is, "injury of the type the antitrust laws
were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes [the] acts
unlawful."'1 95 In Brunswick, plaintiffs were operators of bowling alleys
who claimed that defendant's acquisition of a defunct rival was unlawful
and that because defendant had operated the defunct rival, plaintiffs
made less money than they would have made but for the illegal acquisi-
tion.196 The Supreme Court held that, even though defendants might
have violated the antitrust laws and that violation might have injured
plaintiffs, plaintiffs still could not recover because they had not suffered
antitrust injury.197 Plaintiffs' profits did decline, but the decline was due
to enhanced competition, not due to any conduct that violated the anti-
trust laws.198
A corollary to the antitrust injury doctrine is that a party, to sue under
the antitrust law, must show that it was a competitor or consumer in the
market that the antitrust violation affected. 99 The antitrust laws are de-
signed to "assure customers the benefits of price competition and ... [to
protect] the economic freedom of participants in the relevant market. '200
Consequently, if a plaintiff is neither a competitor nor a consumer in the
market in which trade was restrained, it is outside the protection of the
antitrust laws.20
In addition, the third, fourth, and fifth factors in the Associated General
Contractors standing formulation are borrowed from the Supreme
Court's decision in Illinois Brick.202 There, the Supreme Court held that
only those purchasing directly from price-fixers, and not others in the
chain of distribution, may sue for treble damages under the Clayton
191. Id. at 537-44.
192. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
193. I11. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
194. Brunswick Corp., 429 U.S. at 489.
195. Id. at 488.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 490.
198. Id.
199. Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519
(1983); see Bhan v. NME Hosp., Inc., 772 F.2d 1467, 1470 (9th Cir. 1958).
200. Galavan Supplements Ltd. v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., No. C 97-3259 FMS,
1997 WL 732498, at * 3 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (internal quotations omitted).
201. Id.
202. I11. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 737 (1977).
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Act.2 0 3 The Court observed that direct purchasers were the most efficient
enforcers of the antitrust laws and, unlike indirect purchasers, would not
be saddled with the enormous burden of tracing overcharges through the
chain of distribution.204 In turn, limiting suits to direct purchasers would
ease the burdens on the courts which would not have to deal with "mas-
sive evidence and complicated theories" that would increase the overall
cost of antitrust litigation and reduce its net benefits. 20 5 The Court also
expressed reservations about permitting a class of purchasers remote
from the wrongdoers to proceed when a directly affected group of plain-
tiffs existed.20 6 Finally, permitting indirect purchasers to sue would en-
courage plaintiffs to assert speculative damage claims and create the
possibility of duplicative liability for defendants.20 7 At the very least, the
fact finder would have to make a complex apportionment of damages.
208
Applying the five-factor test to the record facts in Associated General
Contractors, the Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiffs in that case
lacked standing. At the same time, the Court recognized that a "number
of other factors may be controlling" on the issue of antitrust standing.
20 9
Thus, the standing requirement exists independently of any legal test, and
it is important to remember that the goal of the standing analysis is to
determine whether a particular plaintiff is outside the zone of protection
of the antitrust laws and not the application of a test per se.210 Other
factors relevant to the standing analysis under Associated General Con-
tractors include the core policy goals of the antitrust laws. 211 The Sher-
man Act is intended to protect consumers and competitors participating
in American markets.212 In enacting the FTAIA, Congress did not intend
to enlarge the doctrine of standing to encompass foreign purchasers par-
ticipating in foreign markets.213
In addition, the Supreme Court in Associated General Contractors in-
vites courts to consider the judicial burden imposed by "massive and
complex damages litigation. '214 Allowing foreign plaintiffs suing on for-
eign transactions to proceed in federal court rather than in a foreign
venue would result in a massive number of foreign antitrust actions being
filed in the United States. These foreign claims are likely to be supported
by equally massive and complex foreign evidence.
203. Id. at 735.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 745.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 730.
208. See Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S.
519 (1983).
209. Id. at 538.
210. See In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 127 F. Supp. 2d 702, 716 (D. Md. 2001).
211. Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc., 459 U.S. at 538.
212. Id.
213. H.R. REP. No. 97-686, at 11 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
214. Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc., 459 U.S. at 545 (citing Illinois Brick Co. v. Illi-
nois, 432 U.S. 720, 737 (1977)).
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The case law addressing standing of foreign purchasers is sparse.
Whether a foreign plaintiff suing under the United States antitrust laws
based on transactions abroad has standing presents a unique question.
The usual antitrust standing question involves claims by a plaintiff whose
antitrust injuries are derivative or remote. For example, a defendant's
antitrust drives a company from the field. The company's employees,
shareholders, creditors, and officers are all denied antitrust standing be-
cause their injury is derivative of that suffered by the company. 215 Ac-
cordingly, the company is the only victim with antitrust standing.
In foreign-purchaser cases, that sort of remoteness or derivativeness
does not arise. Often, the foreign plaintiff purchases directly from the
wrongdoers. In such cases, derivativeness or remoteness comes into play
not because the foreign plaintiff is remote from the wrongdoer in the
distribution chain but because the foreign plaintiff is not a participant in
the United States market. Any injury suffered abroad is at best remote
from, or indirectly linked to, the United States market.
Not all courts agree with the foregoing analysis. For example, the D.C.
Circuit in Empagran I, upheld the standing of foreign plaintiffs buying
outside of the United States:
the antitrust laws forbid the fixing of prices in foreign markets where
that conduct harms United States commerce. Where defendants'
global conspiracy harms United States commerce, the mere fact that
the foreign purchasers bought vitamins solely in foreign markets
does not mean that the foreign purchasers lack standing to sue.216
In so ruling, the D.C. Circuit partly relied on its analysis of the FTAIA:
"the arguments that have already persuaded us that . . . FTAIA allows
foreign plaintiffs . . . to sue to enforce the antitrust laws similarly per-
suade us that the antitrust laws intended to prevent the harm that the
foreign plaintiffs suffered here. '217 In particular, the court found that the
House Report accompanying the FTAIA made no distinction between
foreign and domestic consumers, as long as there is a direct, substantial,
and reasonably foreseeable effect on domestic commerce: "foreign pur-
chasers should enjoy the protection of our antitrust laws in the domestic
marketplace, just as our citizens do."'218
That expansive reading of the FTAIA, however, was specifically re-jected by the Supreme Court in Empagran 1.219 The Supreme Court em-
phasized that before the FTAIA's enactment, no cases supported the
right of a foreign plaintiff involved in a foreign transaction to sue under
the Sherman Act.220 The Court further observed that the FTAIA was not
215. See Reibert v. Atl. Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
938 (1973).
216. 315 F.3d at 358.
217. Id. at 359.
218. Id. at 356 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 97-686, at 10) (emphasis added).
219. Empagran 1, 124 S. Ct. 2359, 2371 (2004).
220. Id.
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intended to expand Sherman Act jurisdiction. 21 Given that the FTAIA
did not extend the substantive coverage of the Sherman Act, it follows
that the FTAIA cannot be read to expand the class of private plaintiffs
with standing to sue for treble damages under the Clayton Act.222 To the
extent the D.C. Circuit's standing analysis derived from a similar analysis
of the jurisdictional issues under the FTAIA, it does not survive the Su-
preme Court's ruling in Empagran I. For the same reason, the decision in
Monosodium Glutamate upholding standing of foreign plaintiffs is at odds
with the Supreme Court's ruling in Empagran I and is therefore errone-
ous. The plaintiffs in Monosodium Glutamate made the same "but for"
argument as the plaintiffs in Empagran J.223 However, "but for" causa-
tion is not sufficient to confer standing.224 Nor does the fact that plain-
tiffs were "direct purchasers" of allegedly price-fixed goods confer
standing.225 Plaintiffs in Monosodium Glutamate did not participate in
the United States market and thus may not avail themselves of the
United States antitrust laws' protections.
226
In addition, the D.C. Circuit in Empagran I concluded that the foreign
plaintiffs had standing under the Associated General Contractors test.
2 27
The court concluded that foreign purchasers who had bought priced-fixed
vitamins directly from defendants engaged in a global conspiracy had
been injured within the meaning of the Clayton Act.228 The circuit court
then found that the foreign purchasers were proper plaintiffs because
none of the Associated General Contractors factors were disqualifying.
229
That approach, however, is precisely the kind of knee-jerk standing anal-
ysis that Associated General Contractors sought to avoid.
First, the fact of injury merely begins and does not end the standing
inquiry.230 Second, as discussed above, 231 the Court in Associated Gen-
eral Contractors acknowledged that other factors in addition to those spe-
cifically articulated in Associated General Contractors may control the
standing analysis. The D.C. Circuit did not consider whether permitting
foreign plaintiffs involved in foreign sales standing to sue would conflict
with the core mission of the antitrust laws to preserve the freedom of
domestic markets. Nor did the court account for the likelihood that its
ruling will encourage a massive influx of foreign antitrust claims into fed-




223. In re Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litig., No. Civ. COMDL1328(PAM), 2005
WL 1080790, at *8 (D. Minn. May 2, 2005).
224. See supra notes 187-204 and accompanying text
225. See Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litig., 2005 WL 1080790, at *7.
226. See supra notes 208-09 and accompanying text.
227. Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman LaRoche, Ltd., 315 F.3d 338, 358 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
228. Id.
229. Id. at 359.
230. Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S.
519, 536 (1983).
231. See supra notes 168-73 and accompanying text.
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In upholding a foreign purchaser's standing to sue under the antitrust
laws on a foreign transaction, both the D.C. Circuit in Empagran I and
the trial court in Monosodium Glutamate are at odds with decisions
reached in Galavan Supplements, Ltd. v. Archer Daniels Midland Co.232
and In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litigation.233 In Galavan, the court
held that while the foreign plaintiff properly alleged subject matter juris-
diction under the FTAIA, it nevertheless lacked standing to sue under the
Clayton Act.234 Even though the plaintiff claimed to have been injured
by elevated prices of citric acid, it was outside the protection of the anti-
trust laws because it was "neither a competitor nor a consumer in the
United States domestic market. '235 The court reasoned that "'Congress
did not intend recovery under the antitrust laws by an individual who
traded and was injured, entirely outside of United States commerce." 236
The court stressed that the standing doctrine requires the antitrust plain-
tiff to show the alleged injury is related to defendant's anticompetitive
behavior and, "as a corollary, that the injured party be a participant in the
same market as the alleged malefactors." 237
Nor could plaintiffs' complaint be saved by allegations that defendant's
conduct had adversely impacted both the world-wide market and the
United States domestic market.238 The court ruled that the "antitrust
laws do not extend to protect foreign markets from anticompetitive ef-
fects. '239 Since plaintiff purchased the citric acid outside the United
States and was neither an importer nor exporter in trade with the United
States, it was outside the antitrust laws' protection.240
In In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litigation, Judge Motz embraced the
reasoning of the Galavan court and, in dismissing the claims of foreign
defendants on standing grounds, concluded that a plaintiff who has not
participated in the United States domestic market may not claim the pro-
tection of the Sherman Act.241
In addition, Judge Motz's analysis of the legislative history of the
FTAIA is instructive on the standing issue. Careful analysis of that legis-
lative history reveals that Congress did not intend to permit all foreign
consumers injured by alleged antitrust violations to sue under the Sher-
man Act.242 Although the legislative history says that foreign purchasers
may be protected under the Sherman Act even if they "take title abroad
and suffer injury abroad," nowhere does that same legislative history say
232. No. C 97-3259, 1997 WL 732498 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
233. 127 F. Supp. 2d 702 (D. Md. 2001).
234. Galavan Supplements, Ltd., 1997 WL 732498, at *3-4.
235. Id. at *4.
236. Id. (quoting De Atucha v. Commodity Exch., Inc. 608 F. Supp. 510, 518 (S.D.N.Y.
1985)).
237. Galavan Supplements, Ltd., 1997 WL 732498, at *4 (internal quotations omitted).
238. Id.
239. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
240. Id. at *4 n.2.
241. In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 127 F. Supp. 2d 702, 715 (D. Md. 2001).
242. Id. at 715.
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that a foreign plaintiff may sue if it "actually makes the purchase abroad
and does not otherwise participate in a [United States] market.
243
Thus, participation in the United States market is crucial to establishing
antitrust standing:
Although this distinction may seem legalistic, it is significant. The
concept that a purchaser may take title or suffer injury at a place
different from the place where he engages in the sale transaction is
well known to the law. However, by using language embodying that
concept, the legislative history reflects that Congress was proceeding
from the premise that, wherever title is taken or economic injury is
suffered, at least some aspect of the sales transaction took place in
the United States. Any doubt on that score is resolved the next-to-
last quoted sentence which states that "[f]oreign purchasers should
enjoy the protection of our antitrust laws in the domestic market-
place, just as our citizens do." Nothing is said about protecting for-
eign purchasers in foreign markets.
24 4
I therefore have no difficulty in concluding that foreign consumers who
have not participated in any way in the United States markets have no
right to institute a Sherman Act claim. Accordingly, whether the issue is
viewed as one of subject matter jurisdiction or standing, foreign purchas-
ers who have not participated in the United States market may not sue
under the antitrust laws.
245
The late Professor Phillip Areeda has suggested the following frame-
work for analyzing antitrust standing:
... clear thinking about standing usually begins with injury in fact,
then with the theory by which that injury can be caused by alleged
acts violating the antitrust laws, then with issues of proximity empha-
sized here, and, finally, with antitrust injury. In addition, the claimed
damages must be reasonably measurable .... 246
The first question under the Areeda framework is whether foreign
plaintiffs purchasing abroad have in fact been injured. Foreign plaintiffs
purchasing price-fixed goods from the alleged malefactors will invariably
meet this test. However, as the Supreme Court pointed out in Associated
General Contractors, "the mere fact that the claim is literally encom-
passed by the Clayton Act does not end the inquiry.
2 47
The second question under the Areeda framework raises the issue of
proximate cause. At first blush, it appears an open-and-shut case that
foreign plaintiffs purchasing outside the United States market cannot
show that illegal price fixing in the United States proximately caused
their injury. Foreign plaintiffs seek to overcome this hurdle by claiming
that their purchases were made and their injuries incurred in a "global
243. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
244. Id.
245. Id. at 716.
246. AREEDA ET AL., supra note 142, $ 339, at 338.




market" that included the United States.248 Plaintiffs attempt to support
their global-market argument by proffering an arbitrage theory, asserting
that "defendants' cartel would have been unsustainable if the United
States had been excluded from it" because plaintiffs would have pur-
chased vitamins either in the United States or from "arbitrageurs selling
vitamins [that they had] imported from the United States. '249 Plaintiffs
thus argue that they would not have been hurt "but for" the fact that the
vitamin cartel included the United States. Therefore, the foreign plain-
tiffs urge that they have standing.
The "but for" argument is fatally flawed. The test for antitrust standing
has always been proximate cause; the less rigorous "but for" causation
standard has never been viewed as sufficient to confer standing. 250 A
plaintiff's "but for" approach would open the United States courts to a
flood of foreign claimants' allegeding that foreign restraints that injured
them could not have occurred "but for" the worldwide conspiracy. It
posits that vitamins have just one relevant "global market." That is not
the case, though. Any "global market" is an aggregation of national mar-
kets. Whether and the degree to which these national markets are inter-
linked to form one world-wide market depends on the amount of
arbitrage activity; and that inquiry raises complex economic issues. As
the Supreme Court stated in Empagran I, federal courts must be able to
make threshold decisions about the applicability of antitrust statutes
"simply and expeditiously" without a "legally and economically technical
... enterprise" that may lead to lengthier and more expensive proceed-
ings. 251 It is too difficult for the courts to assess the interconnection of
national markets without resorting to speculation and guesswork. Any
injury suffered by foreign plaintiffs abroad is simply too remote from the
illegal conduct in the United States to allow for standing, because there
are too many links between the illegal conduct in the United States and
the foreign injury.252 Simply put, a plaintiff's theory of arbitrage is not
sufficient to connect the dots to establish a defendant's wrongdoing as the
proximate cause of any injury to a foreign plaintiff cognizable under the
antitrust laws.
On this issue, the de Atucha253 case is instructive. Plaintiff lost money
speculating in silver futures on the London Metal Exchange.254 He
claimed that his losses were due to the action of the Hunt brothers in the
United States, who caused silver prices to rise and then to fall signifi-
cantly by "dumping" their interests. 255 Nevertheless, he sued various
248. See, e.g., Galavan Supplements Ltd. v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., No. C 97-
3259, 1997 WL 752498 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
249. Brief for the Plaintiffs, at 10, 20, Empagram S.A. v. F. Hoffman LaRoche, Ltd., 315
F.3d 338 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
250. Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 477-78 (1982).
251. Empagran 1, 124 S. Ct. 2359, 2369 (2004).
252. See AREEDA ET AL., supra note 142, 339a-b, at 326-27.
253. de Atucha v. Commodity Exch., Inc., 608 F. Supp. 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
254. Id. at 513.
255. Id. at 512.
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American exchanges and clearinghouses alleging that they had failed to
stabilize silver prices.256 Even though plaintiff had not traded in the
United States, he alleged that the American prices and London prices
were interdependent. 257 The court denied standing:
[De Atucha]'s theory of antitrust injury depends upon a complicated
series of market interactions between the two [silver markets]: the
[United States market] in which defendants acted and the [London
Metals Exchange] on which [de Atucha] allegedly sustained injuries.
To establish a causal chain, the actions of innumerable individual de-
cision-makers must be reconstructed. Indeed, to find antitrust dam-
ages in this case would engage the court in hopeless speculation
concerning the relative effect of an alleged conspiracy in the [United
States silver futures] market on the price of [LME silver forwards],
where countless other market variables could have intervened to af-
fect those pricing decisions.
258
Third, concerns about the directness of a foreign plaintiff's injury are
closely related to concerns about proximate cause. Foreign purchasers in
Empagran I bought directly from the defendants. 259 Accordingly, they
are indirect not in the sense that they purchased from intermediaries but
in the sense that a more efficient class of plaintiffs-United States pur-
chasers-exists to enforce the antitrust laws. In Empagran I itself, do-
mestic purchasers pursued defendants vigorously and obtained
settlements in excess of two billion dollars. 260 To permit foreign purchas-
ers to sue in the face of the large number of domestic plaintiffs who have
actually sued and recovered would be a form of economic piling-on and
would be inconsistent with the rationale of Illinois Brick.
261
The same concerns are relevant when considering the standing of for-
eign plaintiffs suing on foreign transactions. Issues of economic linkage
between national markets would complicate, weigh down, and prolong
litigation. Domestic purchasers are better situated to sue because they
need not show that linkage and hence lack the baggage that foreign plain-
tiffs would bring to American courtrooms. Moreover, permitting such
foreign plaintiffs to sue would expose defendants to potentially massive
amounts of liability, far beyond that contemplated by the antitrust laws,
and would be speculative in nature.
Fourth, the foreign plaintiffs cannot prove antitrust injury. Foreign
plaintiffs purchasing abroad are outside the protection of the antitrust
laws because they are not competitors or consumers in marketplaces that
the Sherman Act protects.262 The Sherman Act protects participants in
256. Id.
257. Id. at 513-14.
258. Id. at 515-16 (internal quotations omitted).
259. Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman LaRoche, Ltd., 315 F.3d 338, 342 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
260. Janet L. McDavid & Shane Anderson, The Empagran Decision, NAT'L L.J., July
12, 2004, at 12.
261. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 734 (1977).
262. Galavan Supplements, Ltd. v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., No. C 97-3259 FMS,,
1997 WL 732498, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
14492005]
SMU LAW REVIEW
the domestic and foreign commerce of the United States. Foreign pur-
chasers buying abroad are by definition not participants in the domestic
commerce of the United States.263 Similarly, foreign purchasers who are
neither exporters nor importers in trade with the United States are not
engaged in the foreign commerce of the United States. 264 As the court in
de Atucha observed, "Congress did not intend recovery under the anti-
trust laws by an individual who traded, and was injured entirely outside of
United States commerce. '265
The D.C. Circuit in Empagran I reasoned that permitting foreign plain-
tiffs injured outside the United States to sue in American courts is justi-
fied because such suits will enhance deterrence. 266 While that argument
may have some visceral appeal, closely analyzing deterrence concerns
casts considerable doubt on its validity. Deterrence may well be en-
hanced by adding more plaintiffs. More, however, is not necessarily bet-
ter. As the Justice Department in its amicus brief before the Supreme
Court pointed out, adding foreign plaintiffs may in fact lessen deterrence
by discouraging defendants from self-reporting antitrust violations and
then seeking amnesty. 267 Although a grant of amnesty can shield the de-
fendant of criminal prosecutions, it cannot bar private actions against that
same person. Potentially massive civil liability, made even greater by the
presence of foreign purchasers, may discourage self-reporting, which, in
turn, may leave serious antitrust violations undetected. 268 Similarly, the
Supreme Court recognized that the deterrence argument cuts both ways
but concluded that plaintiffs' position was unpersuasive: "the answer to
the dispute is neither clear enough, nor of such likely empirical signifi-
cance, that it could overcome the considerations we have previously dis-
cussed and change our conclusion. '269
In short, the net effect of foreign suits on deterrence is at best uncer-
tain. Even if deterrence were promoted by allowing foreign suits, there
remains a serious question whether deterrence is even a proper concern
in the standing calculus. The D.C. Circuit relied heavily on the Pfizer
case 270 when developing its standing analysis. 271 Pfizer, however, was not
a standing case; the issue in that case was whether foreign governments
were "persons" within the meaning of section 4 of the Clayton Act.272
The Court's discussion of standing was limited to the proposition that a
foreign entity buying in the United States should enjoy the same antitrust
263. Id.
264. Id. n.2.
265. De Atucha v. Commodity Exch., Inc., 608 F. Supp. 510, 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
266. Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman LaRoche, Ltd., 315 F.3d 338, 355-57 (D.C. Cir.
2003).
267. See Brief for the United States and the FTC as Amici Curiae, Empagran S.A., 315
F.3d 338, available at www.usdoj.govlatr/cases/f205300/205386.htm.
268. Id.
269. Empagran I, 124 S. Ct. 2359, 2372 (2004).
270. Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978).
271. Empagran S.A., 315 F.3d at 355-57.
272. Pfizer, Inc., 434 U.S. at 309.
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protection as other domestic purchasers. 273 The D.C. Circuit's reliance
on Pfizer to uphold suits by foreign purchasers buying in foreign markets
is thus misplaced.
CONCLUSION
The foreign plaintiffs in Empagran fare no better under their "but for"
theory than under their original theory. As a matter of law, "but for"
causation is insufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction under the
FTAIA over claims by foreign plaintiffs arising abroad. Nor do foreign
plaintiffs who do not participate in the United States market have stand-
ing to sue under the antitrust laws. The analyses in Associated General
Contractor, Brunswick and Illinois Brick, limiting the class of plaintiffs
who can sue under the antitrust laws, fit the Empagran case like a glove.
Neither Empagran I nor Empagran II is likely to eliminate antitrust
claims by foreign plaintiffs in United States courts. Nevertheless, the fact
that the D.C. Circuit and the Second Circuit-once friendly turf for for-
eign plaintiffs-have both changed their tune in the wake of Empagran I
bodes ill for foreign claimants.
273. Id. at 313-15.
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